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I. INTRODUCTION
{1}Responding to the statutory deadline in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) released its first Local Competition Order (LCO), In Re Implementation
of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, CC
Docket No. 96-98 (FCC 96-325), on August 8, 1996. (1) Designed to implement local competition
nationwide, this Order in nearly 1500 pages promulgated detailed provisions regarding the relationship
between the Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs") (traditional monopoly providers of local
telephone service) and new entrants in local telecommunications.
{2}This article focuses on several key provisions in the first LCO implementing §§ 251, 252, 271, and 272 of
the Telecommunications Act and how these provisions affect local telecommunications competition as the
twenty-first century begins. First, this article examines each of these critical statutory provisions in detail and
how the FCC implemented them in the first LCO. Then this article looks at the legal challenges made to these
regulations by both RBOCs and new entrants and the FCC's response in its revised LCO.
II. BACKGROUND
{3}Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("the Act"), Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996), to promote competition for local telecommunications services and deregulate the provision of local
telecommunications services nationwide. (2) The Act eliminated the monopoly position in local telephone
service held by all seven RBOCs since the breakup of "Ma Bell" in 1984. (3) In the Act, Congress required
that the FCC adopt all regulations necessary to implement local telecommunications competition nationwide
within six months of enactment. (4) The first LCO, (5) adopted by the FCC in August 1996, created
significant controversy over the regulatory standards applicable to interconnection and unbundled network
elements (UNEs). (6) This controversy led to the filing of several lawsuits challenging first, the FCC's
authority to issue the first LCO, and second, the FCC's authority to compel unbundling of specific RBOC
network elements in that Order. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit consolidated these
cases on appeal and vacated the challenged FCC rules. (7) Responding to the Eighth Circuit's ruling that the
FCC lacked jurisdiction to issue the first LCO, the Supreme Court reversed its ruling in part and upheld the
FCC's administrative jurisdiction. (8) However, the Supreme Court agreed with the Eighth Circuit that the
FCC had failed to support its definition of UNEs with adequate regulatory justification in the first LCO. (9)
The Supreme Court remanded the first LCO back to the FCC for reconsideration of the regulatory standards
applicable to UNEs. With the adoption of the revised LCO on September 15, 1999, the FCC both responded
to the Supreme Court's "UNE Remand" in Iowa Utilities and, more importantly, gave further impetus to
achieving meaningful local telecommunications competition. (10)
 
III. WRITING THE NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS BIBLE:THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ACT OF 1996
{4}Congress intended that regulatory implementation of the Act achieve the full benefits of meaningful local
telecommunications competition within a very short period by "get[ting] everybody into everybody else's
business." (11) Under the Act, RBOCs first enter local telecommunications markets outside their former
monopoly region and, later, enter the national long distance market. Existing long distance providers can
enter local telephone service markets as well. In the final Senate debate on the Act, Senator Harkin argued
that "[t]he essential purpose of this measure is to foster competition by removing barriers between distinct
telecommunications industries and allow[ing] everyone to compete." (12) Senator Dole believed that, by
allowing new entrants into local telecommunications markets, the Act would complete the unfinished
business of telecommunications deregulation begun in 1984 with the breakup of AT&T. (13) Supporters of
the Act emphasized the "level playing field [created by the Act] where every player will be able to compete
on the basis of price, quality, and service, rather than on the basis of monopoly control of the market." (14)
The Senate clearly intended that the FCC would decide quickly what were the "rules of the road" in local
telecommunications competition. (15) The House Report on the Act contained findings necessary to justify
nationwide local telecommunications competition, including the reasonable conclusion that the RBOCs'
monopoly position in local telephone service was a "bottleneck" posing significant harm to consumers. (16)
To the Telecommunications Act's supporters, the FCC's most important role after enactment was in
facilitating a swift transition from the "bad old days" of monopoly provision of local telephone service to a
new era of fully competitive and deregulated local telecommunications markets.
{5}The interest invoked most frequently in congressional debates on the Telecommunications Act was, quite
correctly, the public interest in obtaining better telecommunications services at lower cost. (17) In signing the
Act, President Clinton also focused on the importance of protecting the public interest in receiving
competitive local telephone service. (18) Several senators expressed concern that the Act promoted the
private interests of telecommunications companies at the expense of the public interest. (19) The emphasis on
swift delivery of competition and deregulation created legitimate concerns about accountability expressed by
the Act's congressional opponents.
The short time-frame provided in the [Act] … could provide the incumbent Bell company with
the ability to use its stranglehold monopoly on local service to leverage its new long-distance
service to the detriment of consumers. Regulators will have to be vigilant to this potential
consequence. (20)
{6}One of the greatest concerns expressed by the Act's opponents was its compulsory regulatory timetable
for implementing local telecommunications competition. For example, Section 251(d)(1) of the Act required
that "[w]ithin 6 months after the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Commission
shall complete all actions necessary to establish regulations to implement the requirements of this section."
47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(1) (1996).] [Under section 271, the FCC is only given ninety days to decide whether an
RBOC could participate in local and long distance markets based on a further regulatory determination that
the RBOC faced meaningful local telecommunications competition. 47 U.S.C. § 271(D)(3) (1996). The Act's
congressional opponents feared that the continuing trend of corporate combinations in telecommunications,
along with the regulatory protections repealed by the Act, might ultimately hurt consumers. (21)
IV. THE FCC'S FIRST LOCAL COMPTETION ORDER ("LCO"): THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS?
A. Section 251
{7}Section 251 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(1) (1996), imposes a general duty on all telecommunications
carriers "to interconnect directly … with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications carriers."
Section 251(a), 47 U.S.C. § 251(a) (1996), requires compliance with the Act by local exchange carriers
("LECs"), incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs"), and RBOCs. Congress ordered the FCC to establish
cost standards for those unbundled network elements (UNEs) that it later ordered the RBOCs to provide new
entrants in telecommunications. (22) As defined by the Act in § 251, interconnection requires that the RBOCs
provide access to any requesting carrier at any technically feasible point in the RBOC's network. Found in 47
U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (1996), this interconnection requirement applies to RBOCs and ILECs but not to LECs
because of LECs perceived weaker market influence than that held by RBOCs and ILECs. Section 251 also
requires that RBOCs offer unbundled access to their network elements at any technically feasible point where
any new entrant requests access. (23) To prevent RBOCs from discriminating in favor of themselves or an
affiliated telecommunications company, the conference report on the Act clarified the definition of technically
feasible. The report stated that "[a]t a minimum, [Congress] intends that any technically feasible point would
be any point at which the [RBOC] provides access to any other party, including itself or any affiliated entry."
(24) Section 251 also mandates that unbundled access to RBOC network elements occurs in a way "that
allows requesting carriers [or new entrants in telecommunications] to combine such [unbundled network]
elements in order to provide telecommunications service." (25)
{8}Congress also listed in § 251 the FCC's duties in achieving meaningful local telecommunications
competition. Section 251(d) provided the FCC with a standard for defining those UNEs that must be made
available by the RBOCs to new entrants in local telecommunications. Congress required that the FCC
consider, at a minimum, whether competitive access to a network element was "necessary" or whether
denying competitive access to a network element would "impair" meaningful local telecommunications
competition. The "necessary" standard applies to proprietary elements of RBOC networks, while the "impair"
standard applies to both proprietary and non-proprietary network elements. (26) Under this standard, if the
FCC decides that access to RBOC UNEs is necessary, the agency can order an RBOC to provide access to
any new entrant. (27) Further, if the FCC decides that an RBOC denial of access impairs meaningful local
telecommunications competition, it can overrule the denial and order an RBOC to provide any new entrant
access to UNE's. (28) Section 251(d) quickly became known as the "necessary and impair" standard in the
Act.
B. Section 252
{9}Section 252 details the process by which new entrants in telecommunications request interconnection to
RBOC networks in order to offer competitive local telephone service. Typically, a new entrant for local
telephone service gains access to RBOC UNEs under a comprehensive contract or interconnection agreement
where, for a fee, the RBOC allows the new entrant access to its network at technically feasible points of
access. The two companies negotiate both pricing and terms of access in their interconnection agreement.
Without access to RBOC UNEs via an interconnection agreement, new entrants in local telecommunications
face the formidable task of either duplicating the RBOC's existing network (at a prohibitively expensive cost)
or seeking other, more costly ways to offer competitive local telephone service.
{10}Congress placed the initial burden for negotiating interconnection agreements on the private parties,
reminding both RBOCs and new entrants in local telecommunications that all interconnection agreements
must comply with the Act's pro-competitive vision. (29) If the private parties are unable to reach an
interconnection agreement, either may petition the appropriate state public utility commission to settle the
dispute by arbitration since these state agencies are charged with regulating telecommunications carriers. (30)
Unlike § 251, which vests sole regulatory authority in the FCC, § 252 allows state public utility commissions
to control the rates that RBOCs charge new entrants in local telecommunications for UNE access. Finally, §
252 requires state public utility commission approval for "[a]ny interconnection agreement adopted by
negotiation or arbitration." (31) The process outlined in § 252 makes interconnection agreements a
fundamental building block in achieving meaningful local telecommunications competition. Section 252
preserves a role for state public utility commissions in regulating telecommunications while at the same time
reflecting the new federal regulatory push for meaningful local telecommunications competition.
C. Section 271
{11}In its conference report on the Act, Congress linked the duty to negotiate and implement interconnection
agreements addressed in §§ 251 and 252 with the application process that allows RBOCs to enter new
telecommunications markets in § 271. (32) Section 271 details how RBOCs enter markets outside their
former monopoly region to offer local telephone service and how to offer long distance service within their
former monopoly region. (33) Before an RBOC offers either new service under § 271, the FCC must certify
that the RBOC faces meaningful local telecommunications competition in its former monopoly region. (34)
Congress specifically required that the FCC complete this § 271 certification within ninety days of receiving
an RBOC's § 271 application to offer new services. (35) Once it receives FCC certification under § 271, an
RBOC may compete for local and long distance service nationwide. Congress commented extensively on the
pro-competitive goals of § 271 in its conference report on the Act.
New section 271(c) sets out the requirements for an [RBOC] provision of interLATA services
originating in an in-region State … In addition to complying with the specific interconnection
requirements under new section 271(c)(2), an [RBOC] must satisfy the in-region test by virtue of
the presence of a facilities-based competitor or competitors under new section 271(c)(1)(A). (36)
{12}The Act offered two paths for RBOC entry into long distance (or interLATA) service in § 271(c)(1). (37)
Section 271(c)(1)(A) allows RBOC entry into long distance service once a facilities-based competitor for
local telephone service exists in the RBOCs own region. The Act also mandates that the facilities-based
competitor sign a binding interconnection agreement with the RBOC to provide competing local telephone
service in the RBOC's own region. (38) Known as the "pick and choose" rule, § 271(c)(1)(A) allows
competitors to choose whether they will offer competing local telephone service exclusively over their own
networks or via UNE access provided by the RBOC. (39) An RBOC needs FCC certification under § 271 that
meaningful local telecommunications competition exists in its own region before an RBOC can participate in
newly competitive local or long distance telephone markets. In order to certify that meaningful local
competition exists in a given RBOC region, the FCC applies a twelve-step "competitive checklist" found in §
271(2)(B) to each RBOC § 271 application. The FCC grants regulatory permission to compete if an RBOC's
§ 271 application satisfies the competitive checklist in that section of the Act.
{13}While the most important path to competition is found in § 271(c)(1)(A), the Act allowed a second path
for RBOC entry into newly competitive long distance telephone markets through § 271(c)(1)(B). Section
271(c)(1)(B) provided that, if no competitor enters an RBOC's region in order to provide competitive local
telephone service within ninety days of enactment, the RBOC may offer long distance telephone service
without filing a detailed § 271 application with the FCC. Because of the pace of competition, this sub-section
has not been used by an RBOC to offer long distance telephone service.
D. Section 272
{14}Congress aimed at protecting new entrants in local telecommunications from the harm that it perceived
in allowing RBOCs to use their existing monopoly power as leverage in newly competitive
telecommunications markets when it passed § 272. Congress required in § 272(a)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 272(a)(1)
(1996), that the RBOCs establish a separate affiliate to provide competitive local or long distance service
once the RBOCs received FCC permission to compete under § 271. For example, if Verizon (formerly Bell
Atlantic) wants to offer long distance service in Virginia (an in-region state), Verizon is required by § 272 to
set up a separate company in order to offer this service. However, if Verizon wants to provide long distance
service in Wisconsin (an out-of-region state), it does not need to establish a separate company in order to
offer this service (assuming that Verizon had received FCC authorization under § 271). Although at odds with
congressional rhetoric about breaking down barriers in the Act, § 272 in fact enables new entrants in local
telecommunications to compete on a level playing field with RBOCs. Section 272 effectively prevents
RBOCs from attempting to short-circuit meaningful local telecommunications competition by using their
existing monopoly power as leverage against new entrants in local telecommunications.
V. BUILDING THE NEW JERUSALEM IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
THE FIRST LCO & THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
{15}Faced with four new pillars of local telecommunications competition in §§ 251, 252, 271, and 272 of the
Act, the FCC promulgated its first Local Competition Order ("LCO") in August 1996 to support these pillars
with sufficient regulatory firmament so that they would stand the test of time in telecommunications law. The
first LCO labeled § 251 the most important part of a pro-competitive trilogy that the Act directed the FCC to
implement. (40) The FCC acknowledged the direct link between §§ 251 and 271 in its executive summary of
the first LCO:
Competition in local exchange and exchange access markets is desirable … because competition
eventually will eliminate the ability of an [RBOC] to use its control of bottleneck local facilities
to impede free market competition. Under section 251, [RBOCs] are mandated to take several
steps to open their networks to competition … Under section 271, once the [RBOCs] have taken
the necessary steps, they are allowed to offer long distance service in areas where they provide
local telephone service … (41)
This language is virtually identical to that found in the Act. (42) Like Congress, the FCC also recognized the
importance of protecting the public interest in achieving meaningful local telecommunications competition.
The clearest way to promote this kind of competition, according to the FCC, was by adopting flexible
regulations that allow multiple means of entry into local telecommunications markets via § 251. (43)
Consistent with congressional intent in the Act, the FCC stated that the rules governing interconnection and
UNE access in § 251 were "minimum requirements upon which the states may build." (44)
{16}In the first LCO, the FCC outlined a minimum set of five technically feasible points of network access at
which an RBOC must provide interconnection to any requesting carrier under § 251. (45) A point of
interconnection is the point in an RBOC's network at which a new entrant in local telecommunications
connects its own network. (46) The FCC also stated that each point of access to a UNE was also a technically
feasible point of interconnection. (47) Consistent with this interpretation, the FCC concluded that "we should
identify a minimum list of technically feasible points of interconnection that are critical to facilitating entry
by competing local service providers." (48) In linking each point of UNE access to the definition of
technically feasible points of interconnection, (49) the FCC boosted arguments made by new entrants in local
telecommunications that RBOCs had to provide them UNE access whenever and wherever it proved
technically feasible to access the RBOC's network. The FCC identified seven UNEs that must be provided by
all RBOCs to any new entrant that requested interconnection. (50) Under the broad interpretations given
interconnection and UNEs by the FCC in the first LCO, a new entrant could insist that interconnection was
technically feasible at any point in the RBOC's network so long as that point was one of the UNEs listed in
the first LCO. The FCC also concluded that it had authority under § 252 to set national pricing rules for
interconnection and access to UNEs. (51) The FCC decided that uniform national rules on interconnection
and UNEs would facilitate the work of the state public utility commissions by minimizing the potential for
duplicate state litigation and by ensuring quality standards in local telecommunications. (52) Without giving
the standard that it used in defining interconnection and UNE access, the FCC concluded that successful
interconnection was prima facie evidence that a UNE must be provided by the RBOC to any new entrant at
any point of successful interconnection. (53) From the RBOC's perspective, the saving grace in this
expansive world of competitive interconnection is that new entrants in local telecommunications must pay for
this virtually unlimited UNE access.
{17}The first LCO did not offer a detailed regulatory analysis of the FCC's duties under either § 271 or §
272. This is perhaps because the FCC interpreted §§ 251 and 252 as a more important means of promoting
local telecommunications competition and viewed §§ 271 and 272 as less important in achieving the Act's
pro-competitive vision. Because it was unlikely that an RBOC would not face competition for local service in
its own region, the FCC did not flesh out its regulatory duties under § 272 in the first LCO. Recall that § 272
covers only the situation where an RBOC faces no competition for local telephone service within ninety days
after the Act's passage.
{18}The sub-section of § 271 most applicable to the FCC's regulatory authority is § 271(d). This sub-section
provides, first, that an RBOC must apply to the FCC for permission to provide long distance (or interLATA)
service "originating in any in-region [s]tate." (54) Since the Act's passage, the "271 process" has been a
crucial part of the FCC's regulatory work. (55) FCC staff compares each § 271 application with the twelve-
point competitive checklist in § 271 to measure an RBOC's compliance with each checklist provision. FCC
staff then provides analysis of relevant parts of the checklist, and the level of RBOC compliance with the
checklist, to the FCC commissioners for each § 271 application. (56) Recall that § 271 requires RBOC
compliance with the competitive checklist before the FCC grants an RBOC regulatory permission to compete
for local or long distance service. (57) The § 271 application process is consistent with congressional intent
that the FCC should protect the public interest in advancing meaningful local telecommunications
competition via §§ 251, 252, 271 and 272 of the Act. (58)
A. A Bump in the Road to Damascus: The Iowa Utilities Case
{19}Surrounded by controversy, the issues of telecommunications reform and the FCC's proper role in
achieving meaningful local telecommunications competition ended up at the Supreme Court in AT&T v. Iowa
Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). In this case, the FCC faced a fundamental jurisdictional attack from several
state public utility commissions who asserted that the federal agency's proper role in deregulating local
telecommunications was to retire from the field of telecommunications regulation. (59) The FCC also faced a
specific challenge from several leading telecommunications companies to regulations in the first LCO that
implemented uniform national rules on interconnection and UNE's. These telecommunications companies
also challenged the regulatory definitions that the FCC had adopted in the first LCO. The Eighth Circuit held
earlier in Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (1997), that the FCC properly defined key terms in the debate
over how to secure meaningful local telecommunications competition. (60) The Eighth Circuit, however, had
rejected the FCC's regulatory authority over local telecommunications carriers and services. (61)
{20}Reversing the Eighth Circuit's earlier decision in part, the Supreme Court held that the FCC had
jurisdiction "to carry out the provisions of this Act [the Communications Act of 1934] which include §§ 251
and 252 added by the Telecommunications Act of 1996." (62) The Court agreed with the Eighth Circuit that
the FCC's definition of UNEs was "eminently reasonable." (63) However, the Court vacated the FCC's
interpretation of the necessary and impair standard found in § 251 of the Act. The FCC had implied under the
necessary and impair standard that it had discretionary authority to consider either the necessary standard or
the impairment standard in determining whether to order unbundling of RBOC network elements. In the first
LCO, the FCC concluded that the Act imposed on it the regulatory duty to identify a national list of UNEs
that must be provided by RBOCs to all telecommunications carriers requesting interconnection under §§ 251
and 252. The FCC reserved to itself authority to revise this national list of UNEs as technological changes
occurred. (64) The Court held in Iowa Utilities that the FCC had misread the plain language of § 251 when it
discussed the necessary and impair standard in the first LCO. (65) The FCC's interpretation ignored the direct
language of § 251(d)(2). (66) The Court found in Iowa Utilities that the FCC incorrectly gave "blanket
access" to UNEs via a clearly erroneous interpretation of the necessary and impair standard. (67)
{21}In criticizing the FCC's definition of the necessary and impair standard, the Court held that "blanket
access" to RBOC network elements was not what Congress had intended in the Act.
We cannot avoid the conclusion that, if Congress had wanted to give blanket access to
incumbents' networks on a basis as unrestricted as the scheme the Commission has come up
with, it would not have included § 251(d)(2) in the statute at all. It would simply have said …
that whatever requested element can be provided must be provided … [I]t appears that this is
precisely what the Commission thought Congress had said. (68)
{22}Relying on this conclusion and the Eighth Circuit's earlier analysis of the necessary and impair standard,
the Court stated that the FCC's primary mistake in the first LCO had been in asking which network elements
must be unbundled instead of asking where unbundled access must occur. (69) The Court concluded that the
Act authorized the FCC to order the points at which unbundled access must occur but not which specific
RBOC network elements must be unbundled in order to achieve meaningful local telecommunications
competition via access to UNEs. The Court also held that, in addition to improperly mandating blanket access
to UNE's, the FCC violated the Act by combining both cost and quality measurements of network elements
under the necessary and impair standard. (70) The Court found that quality and cost are two separate
measurements for gauging how much access to RBOC UNEs that a new entrant needs in order to offer
competitive local telecommunications services. The FCC had imposed an "all or nothing" cost measurement
in justifying its view of what was necessary or what might impair the development of local
telecommunications competition under §§ 251 and 252. "We believe, generally, that an entrant's ability to
offer a telecommunications service is [impaired] … if the quality of the service … absent access to the
requested element, declines and/or the cost of providing the service rises." (71) The Court held that this cost
measurement was too low a regulatory threshold to withstand judicial review. Specifically, the Court held that
the FCC had failed to consider cost and quality factors of facilities and equipment available outside the
RBOC's network when it implemented uniform national rules on UNE access in the first LCO. (72)
{23} The Court also disagreed with the general tone of "regulatory grace" that permeated the first LCO. (73)
The Court sharply criticized the FCC for reserving to itself the authority to achieve meaningful local
telecommunications competition via administrative agency fiat. The Court then provided a more appropriate
rational basis standard for evaluating the FCC's uniform national rules on interconnection and UNEs.
[Section 251] requires the Commission to determine on a rational basis which network elements
must be made available, taking into account the objectives of the Act and giving some substance
to the necessary and impair requirements. The latter is not achieved by disregarding entirely the
availability of elements outside the [RBOCs] network, and by regarding any increased cost or
decreased service quality as establishing a necessity and an impairment of the ability to provide
services. (74)
With the Court's authoritative interpretation of appropriate telecommunications regulation in Iowa Utilities,
the FCC accepted the challenge of revising its first LCO when the Court remanded back to the agency the
vacated rules in early 1999.
B. Rebuilding the New Jerusalem in Telecommunications: The FCC's Revised LCO (75)
{24}The FCC responded to the Supreme Court's remand of its rules relating to interconnection and UNE's
(known as the "UNE Remand") by issuing a revised LCO on September 15, 1999. (76) As ordered by the
Supreme Court, the FCC devised a rational basis test for evaluating the necessary and impair standard in its
rules on interconnection and UNEs. The FCC "reaffirmed that [RBOCs] must provide unbundled access to
six of the original seven network elements that it required to be unbundled in the original order." (77) The
FCC concluded that unbundled access to these six network elements was necessary to promote meaningful
local telecommunications competition. This conclusion generally reaffirmed the terms of local
telecommunications competition in effect since the FCC issued the first LCO in August 1996. Consequently,
the revised LCO should not create significant legal or practical controversy in how RBOCs currently provide
UNE access to new entrants in local telecommunications.
{25}This does not mean, however, that the revised LCO is without controversy. Since the Supreme Court was
unsatisfied with the FCC's initial determination of the necessary and impair standard, it is unclear how the
FCC could reaffirm six of its seven original UNEs without undertaking a thorough reexamination of the
regulatory justification that it offered for each UNE. The same tone of "regulatory grace" that the Supreme
Court rejected in the first LCO also permeated the revised LCO, constituting a implied rebuff to the judicial
criticism that the FCC needed to reexamine the overall tone of its local telecommunications regulations. In
the revised LCO, the FCC still reserves to itself significant regulatory authority in local telecommunications
competition. State public utility commissions have a role in local telecommunications competition only when
and where the FCC considers it appropriate to include its state-level counterparts. For example, the FCC--and
not the relevant state public utility commissions--imposed significant conditions when it approved the
SBC/Ameritech merger. (78) Although this merger created the nation's second largest local telephone
company, the conditions imposed on the post-merger company put the FCC firmly in charge of local
telecommunications issues and relegated the state public utility commissions to a limited role via regulatory
grace. (79) The SBC/Ameritech merger offered little guidance on what role the FCC sees for state public
utility commissions under the revised LCO. Whatever role eventually develops, it is not likely to come from
the Act's mandates but instead may originate in the same regulatory grace that the Supreme Court criticized
in Iowa Utilities.
{26}Subsequent to the Iowa Utilities decision, but before the FCC issued the revised LCO, several federal
courts commented on the appropriate standard for evaluating whether meaningful local telecommunications
competition exists. (80) In AT&T Comm. of the S. States, Inc., v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 7 F. Supp.2d 661,
667 (E.D. N.C.1998) (hereinafter BellSouth), the court held that a new entrant in local telecommunications
cannot request access to RBOC UNEs in ways that put the RBOC at a competitive disadvantage.
Additionally, the new entrant cannot force the cost of its decision under the pick and choose rule (whether or
not to offer competitive local telephone service over RBOC UNEs or over its own network) onto the RBOC.
(81)
{27}In BellSouth, the court followed a standard of review for state public utility commission involvement in
policing interconnection agreements first announced in U.S. West Comm., Inc. v. Hix. (82) Although it
reached its decision before the Supreme Court decided Iowa Utilities, the Hix court held that there is a two-
part test useful in evaluating state public utility commission review of interconnection agreements and, more
specifically, UNE access provisions contained in those agreements. First, the Hix court held that state public
utility commission decisions are examined under a de novo standard to see if they comply procedurally and
substantively with federal law and regulations. (83) Second, the Hix court held that all other issues involved
in state public utility commission review and policing of valid interconnection agreements were subject to
judicial review under an arbitrary and capricious standard. (84) The Hix court noted that, although judicial
application of an arbitrary and capricious standard to issues other than compliance with federal law and
regulations is normally highly deferential, state public utility commissions should not expect automatic
deference to their decisions regarding interconnection agreements and UNE access. (85) Here, the Hix
decision conflicts with the Supreme Court's subsequent Iowa Utilities decision upholding the deference that
the FCC accorded to itself in the first LCO. (86)
{28}The Supreme Court did not address what deference that courts owed to state public utility commission
decisions in Iowa Utilities. However, other language in that opinion suggests that it is unlikely that the Hix
court's non-deferential view controls when federal courts examine a state public utility commission's
interpretation of, for example, the necessary and impair standard.
None of the statutory provisions that these rules interpret displaces the Commission's general
rulemaking authority. While it is true that the 1996 Act entrusts state commissions with the job
of approving interconnection agreements … these assignments … do not logically preclude the
Commission's issuance of rules to guide the state-commission judgments. (87)
{29}The revised LCO reaffirmed the basic outlines of the necessary and impair standard even as it expanded
the regulatory protection afforded new entrants in local telecommunications under both parts of this
regulatory standard. Important to a new definition of impairment is a reexamination of what constitutes a
proprietary network element under § 251 of the Act. (88) If an RBOC successfully claims to the FCC or the
relevant state public utility commission that a network element is proprietary, then the RBOC escapes the
Act's unbundling requirements as to that element. Since there are no direct FCC Orders providing an exact
definition of what constitutes a proprietary network element, the FCC drew an analogy in the revised LCO to
proprietary as it is defined in FCC Orders covering customer proprietary network information ("CPNI"). (89)
In promulgating a new definition of impairment under the Act, the FCC should be accorded considerable
deference for whatever specific definition it adopts - so long as the FCC grounds its definition of impairment
in a rational basis review of the Act. While the limited nature of the Supreme Court's decision in Iowa
Utilities made it unnecessary for the FCC to reinvent the wheel in its revised LCO, the agency is on notice to
pay closer attention to the deregulatory emphasis of the Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
{30}The revised LCO issued by the FCC on September 15, 1999, was the result of a tumultuous period of
reform, deregulation, and promises of further competition in local telecommunications markets. This new
period began with the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. An historic piece of legislation, the
Act cleared away the regulatory underbrush beneath the Communications Act of 1934 and a strict wall of
separation between local and long distance telephone service created in the aftermath of AT&T's breakup in
1984. When "the walls came a-tumblin down" (so to speak) in local and long distance telecommunications,
the FCC had in place a lengthy first LCO whose speed of promulgation just six months after the Act became
law was matched only by its sheer complexity. Not surprisingly, this complex Order ended up at the Supreme
Court. The Court rendered a careful, detached consideration of the intricate legal, regulatory, and technical
issues surrounding telecommunications reform in AT&T v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). Having been
assured of its regulatory primacy in the new age of telecommunications by most of the Court's decision in
Iowa Utilities, on remand the FCC reconsidered its regulatory scheme for determining what network
elements needed unbundling in order to achieve meaningful local telecommunications competition. With the
revised LCO issued in September 1999, the FCC likely ensured that, in Churchill's memorable phrase, "[t]his
is not the beginning of the end. It is merely the end of the beginning.
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